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1 Introduction
Many social scientists have studied extensively the role of education and
how schooling can create different kinds of private and social benefits. In
particular, the economics literature has established a causal link between
education and private earnings; and more recently, some scholars (Chiswick et
al. 2006) have argued that schooling can increase the earnings of immigrants
through its effect on language proficiency.
In addition, both the political science and the economic literature have in-
vestigated the link between education and political behavior. In this respect,
in 1978, Samuel Bowles argued that the school system has been instrumental
to the interests of the elite and may have helped the consolidation of the
capitalist system. However, there is still not much evidence on the nature of
the channels through which education can affect the political outcomes and
the causal link has only recently been carefully studied. Using compulsory
education laws as instruments, Milligan et al. (2004) found a robust positive
relationship between education and turnout for the United States. However,
this was not the case for the United Kingdom.
In this paper, we focus on the relationship between schooling and political
behavior of citizens in ethnically divided societies. We explore how a linguis-
tic reform that took place in Catalonia affected turnout and party choice. In
1983, the Catalan education system became bilingual and the law established
the predominant use of Catalan in primary and secondary schools. Using
survey data from the “Centro de Investigationes Sociologicas”, we study the
effect of such a reform on the political behavior of Catalan citizens.
Our empirical argument relies on within and between cohort variation in
exposure to Catalan language at school. Between cohorts, the 1983 educa-
tional reform affected the younger cohorts (who were more exposed to the
language) more than the older generations. Within a given cohort, the expo-
sure to Catalan varies according to the number of years for which a student
remains in education, as some students leave school earlier than others.
We find that individuals who experienced greater exposure to teaching in
Catalan are more likely to declare that they have voted in the 1999 regional
election and have chosen a party with a Catalanist (i.e. Catalan regionalist)
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platform. Thus, the introduction of a bilingual education system, a standard
example of a multicultural policy in an ethnically divided society, increased
the salience of the ethnic issue in the Catalan society and helped the consol-
idation of a political system organized along ethnic lines. Several robustness
checks allow us to reject the existence of education specific cohort trends for
political behavior.
In Aspachs, Clots-Figueras and Masella(2007), individuals who experi-
enced greater exposure to the language reform are more likely to say that
they feel more Catalan than Spanish. Interestingly, identity could be the link
between the linguistic reform and political choices.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, there is the
literature that studies the relationship between education and individual po-
litical choices (see Merlo 2006 for a review of the topic) and, in particular,
to that which focuses on the determinants of turnout and political behavior
(Milligan et al. (2004)).
Second, there is a connection with the early political science literature
that analyzes the effect of multicultural policies and national building policies
on individual choices. If we interpret the reform as an example of a nation
building policy within Catalonia, where individuals living in Catalonia who
were born elsewhere, or whose parents are not of Catalan origins are the
relevant minority, we find that the nation building policies foster civic duties
(turnout) and an attachment to nationalistic parties. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze how a linguistic educational
reform affects political behavior in an ethnically divided society.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description
of the reform and more generally of the institutional setting in Catalonia
after 1983 and the data used. Section 3 describes our identification strategy,
while Section 4 presents the basic empirical evidence, discussing the role of
individual origin and the link between reform, ethnic identity and political
decisions. Section 5 provides some robustness checks and Section 6 presents
the conclusions.
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2 Background
2.1 Institutional Setting
The democratization process that occurred in Spain during the late seven-
ties, after the end of Franco’s dictatorship, led to the approval of a Constitu-
tion that defined a decentralized government structure. As basic democratic
rights were recognized, the old political parties, which had existed in secrecy
during the dictatorship, were legalized and new political parties also emerged.
From the five parties in the Catalan Parliament at the time of the survey,
one was created during the transition: Convergència i Unió (CIU), this party
that was in power from 1980 to 2003. The other four had existed, with their
own variations, prior to the dictatorship: Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya
(PSC), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), Partido Popular (PP),
and Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV). Three of these are Catalan-only
parties, CIU, ERC and ICV, in the sense that they only present candidates in
Catalonia, while the other two exist throughout the Spanish territory. In our
wider classification of the Catalan and non-Catalan parties, we consider as
Catalan all parties that have in their programmes the approval of a law that
would give Catalonia the right to self-determination. These parties are CIU,
ERC and ICV. Then we use a narrower classification of the Catalan parties,
in which we include only those parties that are in favour of an independent
Catalonia: CIU and ERC.
After democracy, one of the main concerns of the new Catalan adminis-
tration was the promotion of Catalan in education. The main Educational
law that was undertaken by the Catalan Government was the "General Di-
rectory of Linguistic Policy (1983)" which introduced Catalan (together with
Spanish) as the medium of instruction in all the schools in Catalonia. This
reform was approved by a wide majority when CIU was in power and allowed
the educational system in Catalonia to become bilingual.
The law stated that primary education could not be completed with-
out proving proficiency of the official languages of Catalonia (Catalan and
Spanish). In addition it made clear that the Catalan Language, as the own
language of Catalonia, would also be the language used in the education sys-
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tem. Moreover, according to this law, the language used in the education
system could never separate the alumni due to linguistic differences. Thus
all students would be exposed to Catalan language.
2.2 Data Description
The empirical analysis draws on survey data provided by the "Centro de In-
vestigaciones Sociologicas" in 2001. In this survey, which is representative for
Catalonia, individuals were asked about their age, education, origin, origin
of their parents, time of arrival in Catalonia and questions about their use
of Catalan as well as some ideological questions: their national identity, the
party they voted for in the 1999 elections and whether they voted at all.
The linguistic reform was first implemented the 1983-84 academic year
in every school in Catalonia. In order to identify the cohorts who are likely
to be treated, we assume that all of the respondents started their education
at the age of 6. As a result, since in Spain primary education lasts for 8
years and secondary education for 4 years, a respondent born in 1966 with
secondary education received one year of treatment. The 1966-811 cohorts
have been affected by the reform; thus, a natural comparison group are the
cohorts born between 1950-1965.
Intensity of treatment varies across cohorts and level of education. Indi-
viduals who are younger (born after 1966) and individuals with more years
of education will have been exposed to more years of teaching in Catalan.
If there is a link between language policy and voting behavior, the reform
will change voting behavior for those cohorts who received more treatment.
We expect that individuals who experienced greater exposure to the reform
will feel a greater identification with Catalonia and, as a result, will be more
likely to vote in the regional elections and to choose Catalanist parties. A
preliminary look at the data shows that this is indeed the case.
In Figure 1, we plot the fraction of individuals that voted in the elections
by cohort and level of education (we distinguish between respondents with
secondary education and those without). Even if the younger individuals
1Although we have data for people born in 1982 and 1983, these individuals could not
vote in the 1999 elections as they were under 18, so we do not include them in the sample.
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vote less frequently, this negative trend is attenuated for individuals who
were more affected by the Catalan reform: those born after 1966 who have
secondary education. Figure 2 illustrates the difference between these two
lines, that is, the within-cohort variation. For cohorts who were not affected
by the reform, the line fluctuates around zero, while the difference starts to
increase for cohorts born after 1966.
Figure 3 shows the fraction of voters who voted for Catalanist parties, by
cohort and education. This figure shows a large increase in the proportion of
younger and more educated voters who voted for Catalanist parties, while for
less educated voters there is a positive effect, but less strong. Figure 4 plots
the difference between these two lines and shows the within-cohort variation
for each cohort. As expected, the difference is larger for cohorts born after
1966.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables employed in
this study. It shows descriptive statistics for all individuals, and then for
individuals with and without secondary education. These groups are then
divided among the different samples used in the regressions.
3 Empirical strategy
Students’ exposure to Catalan language varies according to year of birth and
years of education. Using a similar identification strategy to Angrist et al
(2006), we obtain differences-in differences estimates using the equation
yijm = α+ βLijm + γj + δm +Xijmµ+ εijm (1)
Where Lijm is the length of exposure to teaching in Catalan. γj is a cohort
dummy, δm is a dummy for education background and Xijm is a vector of
the individual-level control variables, including gender, individual’s origin,
parents’ origin and province dummies2.
We analyze the effect of the linguistic reform on political behavior, namely
turnout and party preferences. As a consequence, we use several dependent
2We exclude from the sample any migrants who received some education outside Cat-
alonia.
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variables: yijm, indicates whether or not individual i, from cohort j and with
m years of schooling:
(1) Declares to have voted in the 1999 regional election. This specification
checks if the linguistic reform stimulated turnout to the regional elections.
(2) Declares to have voted for a Catalanist party in the 1999 regional
election (we restrict the sample only to people who declared to have voted
in that election). As a first step we consider IC, ERC and CIU as Catalanist
parties, then look only at ERC and CIU. As a last step, we consider only
CIU. This specification checks whether the linguistic reform increased the
share of the votes for Catalanist parties in the regional elections.
(3) Declares to have voted for a Catalanist party in the 1999 regional
election (we do not restrict the sample). As in point (2), we first consider IC,
ERC and CIU as Catalanist parties, then we look only at ERC and CIU and
as a last step, we consider only CIU. This specification checks if the linguistic
reform increased the total number of votes received by Catalanist parties in
the Catalan regional election.
The identification strategy relies on the fact that there is no other variable
that affects the political behavior of the cohort-years of education groups. We
run this specification, first as a linear regression and then as a logit, due to
the binomial nature of the dependent variable3. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the cohort-years of education level, to control for the fact that
observations in a given cohort-years of education group may be correlated.
The second econometric specification to be tested is very similar to the
first one. However the dependent variable can assume three different values.
This time yijm indicates whether individual i, from cohort j and with m years
of schooling declared to have (i) voted for a Catalanist party (ii) voted for
a non-Catalanist party (iii) abstained. We run this specification first as a
multinomial logit; however, the multinomial logit assumes the independence
of irrelevant alternatives. We then run a multinomial probit assuming the
error terms to be independent, and as a last step we run it as a multinomial
probit but relaxing the assumption of independence of the error terms4.
3The results for probit are very similar and available on request.
4We use the asmprobit command in STATA.
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4 Results
4.1 Difference-in-Difference Estimates
Table 2 reports estimates for Equation (1) using as dependent variable the
probability of voting during the regional election of 1999. In Columns 1
and 2, we show estimates when we only control for years of education and
year of birth dummies, for the OLS and the logit specifications, respectively.
OLS estimates show a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that an
increase in exposure to the reform increases the probability that an individual
votes. The logit results go in the same direction and are significant. In
Columns 3 and 4, we add province dummies, controls for gender, family
and individual origin. Coefficients are still positive and significant. The
results suggest that those who received Catalan-intensive instruction tend to
be significantly more likely to vote; in fact, an extra year of education in
Catalan increases the likelihood that the respondent declared to have voted
by 4.5%. The probability of voting is also correlated with the individual
origin and with the origin of the parents of the interviewed. We classified
respondents into 4 categories: 1) individuals who were not born in Catalonia
2) individuals who were born in Catalonia but whose parents were not 3)
individuals who were born in Catalonia but with only one parent born in
Catalonia 4) individuals who were born in Catalonia whose parents were both
born in Catalonia. We find that the probability of voting is highest among
respondents with Catalan origins who have parents with Catalan origins.
Tables 3 and 4 report estimates for equation (1) using as dependent vari-
able the probability of voting for a Catalanist party during the regional elec-
tions in 1999, when we restrict the sample only to people who declared to
have voted in that election (Table 3) and when we do not restrict the sample
(Table 4). In Columns 1 and 2 of both the tables we show estimates for the
OLS and the logit specifications, when we only control for years of education
and year of birth fixed effects and when we classify IC, ERC and CIU as
Catalanist parties. In Columns 3 and 4 of both tables we consider only CIU
and ERC as Catalanist parties. In Columns 5 and 6 of both the tables we
focus only on CIU. OLS estimates show a positive and significant coefficient,
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suggesting that an increase in exposure to the reform increases the proba-
bility that an individual will vote for a Catalanist party. The logit results
go in the same direction and are significant. In Columns 7-12 of both tables
we add province dummies, controls for family and individual origin. The
coefficients are still positive and significant. Results suggest that those who
received Catalan-intensive instruction tend to be significantly more likely to
vote for a Catalanist party, both if we consider the sample of voters or the
total sample. Furthermore, the results clearly show that most of the effects
we find in Tables 3 and 4 come from the increase in the probability of choos-
ing CIU. The probability of voting for a Catalanist party is also correlated,
as predictable, with individual origin and with the origins of the parents of
the interviewed. We find that probability of voting is highest among respon-
dents with Catalan origins and with parents who have Catalan origins. As
shown in Column 8 of Table 3 (restricted sample), an increase from 4 years
of treatment (the average amount of treatment) to 8 years of treatment (the
average amount of treatment plus one standard deviation) would increase
the likelihood that the respondent declared to have voted for a party with
Catalan affiliation by almost 20%. Column 8 of Table 4 (unrestricted sam-
ple) shows that an increase from 4 to 8 years of treatment would increase the
likelihood that the respondent declared to have voted a party with Catalan
affiliation by 27%.
So far results show that the educational language reform fostered attach-
ment to local institutions, as individuals more affected by the reform are
more likely to vote in regional elections. In addition, the reform increased
the salience of the ethnic issue, as individuals more affected by the reform
are more likely to vote for Catalanist parties.
As a final step, we try to understand the effect of the reform on the
decision of voting for a Catalanist party, voting for a non-Catalanist party or
not voting. We then show results using the second econometric specification
mentioned in the previous section. The dependent variable is now a variable
that can assume three different values depending on whether the respondent
(i) voted for a Catalanist party (ii) voted for a non Catalanist party (iii)
abstained. For this specification we consider CIU, ERC and IC as Catalanist
parties. Columns 1-3 of Table 5 report results when we run this specification
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as multinomial logit, columns 4-6 when we run it as a multinomial probit, but
assuming the error terms to be independent. Columns 7-9 report the results
when we run it as multinomial probit but removing the assumption of the
independence of the error term. The picture the table shows is, however,
quite homogeneous. We observe that the reform caused a significant decline
in abstention, a decline (but not always significant at standard level, i.e.
significant at 10 per cent level only with the multinomial logit specification) in
voting for a non-Catalanist party and also a contemporaneous and significant
increase in voting for a Catalanist party.
Results in Columns 7-9 show how an increase in years of Catalan instruc-
tion from 4 to 8 increases the likelihood that the respondent declared to
have voted for a Catalanist party by 25% and decreases the likelihood that
the respondent declared to have voted for a non-Catalanist party by 16%.
However, since the decline in the amount of votes for non Catalanist parties
is not significant in every specification, data do not allow us to distinguish
between two different patterns of voting behavior:
1) a simple switch from abstention to voting for a Catalanist party
2) a more complex scenario in which
(i) on the one hand, the reform contributed to a general rise in electoral
participation and, then, as a result, led to a switch from abstention to voting
for both Catalanist and non-Catalanist parties
(ii) but, on the other hand the reform increased individual preferences
for a Catalanist party and, as a result, led to a switch from voting for a
non-Catalanist party to a Catalanist party.
4.2 Heterogenous effects
In this section we study whether the effect of the reform was homogeneously
spread across the population. As the reform could have different effects
according to the individuals’ origin, we interact our intensity measure with
the 4 origin dummies we created. Table 6 shows that the effect of the reform
on both turnout and preference for a Catalanist party is positive not only for
those respondents with Catalan origin and whose parents were both born in
Catalonia, but also for individuals born in Catalonia but whose parents were
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not, for individuals born in Catalonia with only one parent with Catalan
origin and for individuals who were not born in Catalonia.
Figures 5-7 are useful to interpret the logit coefficients, as they show how
the probability of voting and voting for an ethnic party (for both samples)
changes with the reform for the different origin groups. As is shown in
these figures, while political choices vary widely depending on origin among
individuals with no treatment, origin plays almost no role among individuals
with full treatment. In fact, all figures show that the reform made individuals
from different origins converge in their answers.
Since, as already mentioned in the introduction, we can interpret the
reform as an example of a nation building policy within Catalonia, where
individuals living in Catalonia who were born elsewhere, or whose parents
do not have Catalan origins are the relevant minority, we conclude that nation
building policies foster civic duties (turnout) and attachment to nationalistic
parties.
5 Robustness
In this section we perform several robustness checks on the main specification.
First we show that our results are not driven by education-specific cohort
trends. Then we restrict the sample and conduct some extra checks to control
for the fact that the reform could have encouraged migration in and out of
Catalonia.
5.1 Trends and Falsification Exercise
Estimates in Tables 2, 3 and 4, which show how intensive Catalan instruction
affects political behavior, may be confounded by education-specific cohort
trends for turnout and political preferences. This would happen if parents
transmit voting preferences to their children and parents who vote more in
elections and vote for Catalanist parties also give more education to their
children.
As a formal falsification exercise, we run the specification proposed by
Equation (1) on those cohorts unaffected by the reform, namely cohorts 1934
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to 1965. We give cohorts 1950 to 1965 a pseudo treatment that consists
of the intensity of the reform received by individuals with the same years
of education but born 16 years later. Columns 1-6 of panel A in Table 7
report the results of this exercise. We adopt both an ordinary least squares
and a logit specification. The coefficient of the pseudo treatment variable
is never significant, negative and very small when we consider turnout as
the dependent variable and positive but sufficiently small when we use as
dependent variable whether or not the respondent declared to have voted for
a Catalanist (IC, ERC and CIU) party in the 1999 regional election (both
with the sample restricted only to people who declared to have voted in that
election and with the unrestricted sample).
In addition, in order to correct the estimates in Tables 2-4 for education-
cohort trends, we perform a triple differences-type of analysis similar to that
of Angrist et al (2006), using cohorts born between 1921 and 1980. The
effects of interest are estimated using the following equation:
yijm = α+ βLijm + θlijm + γj + δm +Xijmµ+ εijm (2)
where Lijm is a term that captures real exposure to teaching in Catalan,
while lijm captures spurious effects.
Lijm are the years of real treatment for cohorts 1966-1980; while lijm
equals years of pseudo treatment for cohorts 1936-1950 (where now the
pseudo-treatment consists of the intensity of the reform received by indi-
viduals with the same years of education but born 30 years later) and years
of real treatment for cohorts 1966-19805. β are the triple difference estimates,
i.e. the treatment effects from the real experiment net of the pseudo treat-
ment effects estimated using cohorts 1921-1950. Columns 7-12 of panel A
in Table 9 report the results of this specification. Triple difference estimates
are positive and significant, while the coefficient that would be capturing
spurious trends is negative and not significant. Both exercises are reassur-
ing, as they may indicate that our results are not capturing the effect of an
education-specific cohort trend.
5Due to lack of data about very old cohorts we could not use a larger number of cohorts.
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6 Conclusions
In ethnically divided societies, education can affect political behavior through
the language used for teaching. In particular, the language of instruction used
can increase the salience of the ethnic issue. This paper presents evidence of
a positive effect of the educational reform, whereby the Catalan education
system became bilingual, on turnout and on the likelihood of choosing a
party with a Catalanist nature.
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Figure 1:Participation rate by cohort and level of education
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Figure 2: Effect of the reform on the participation rate by cohort
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Figure 3: Ethnic Voting by cohorts and level of education
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Figure 4: Effect of the reform on Ethnic Voting by cohort
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Years of Education Average 10,38 9,97 10,67 12 12 12 8.46 8.27 8.65
St. Dev. 1,88 1,99 1,74 0 0 0 0.99 0.98 0.97
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
Cat. Origin, Cat. Family Average 0,43 0,46 0,40 0.49 0.56 0.45 0.35 0.38 0.32
St. Dev. 0,49 0,49 0,49 0.5 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.48 0.46
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
Cat. Origin, mixed Family Average 0,17 0,14 0,19 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.19
St. Dev. 0,38 0,35 0,39 0.38 0.35 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.4
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
Cat. Origin, no Cat. Family Average 0,28 0,21 0,32 0.24 0.16 0.28 0.32 0.25 0.39
St. Dev. 0,44 0,41 0,46 0.43 0.37 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.48
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
No Catalan Origin Average 0,11 0,17 0,06 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.14 0.2 0.08
St. Dev. 0,31 0,37 0,25 0.27 0.33 0.23 0.35 0.4 0.27
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
Voting Average 0,77 0,83 0,72 0.79 0.84 0.77 0.74 0.83 0.65
St. Dev. 0,41 0,36 0,44 0.40 0.36 0.41 0.43 0.37 0.47
Observations 1248 528 720 642 223 419 606 305 301
Catalan voting (CIU+ERC+IC) Average 0,50 0,52 0,48 0.56 0.57 0.55 0.42 0.48 0.37
St. Dev. 0,50 0,49 0,50 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.48
Observations 1248 528 720 642 223 419 606 305 301
Catalan voting (CIU+ERC) Average 0,44 0,47 0,42 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.39 0.45 0.33
St. Dev. 0,19 0,49 0,49 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.48 0.49 0.47
Observations 1248 528 720 642 223 419 606 305 301
Catalan voting (CIU) Average 0,31 0,33 0,29 0.31 0.3 0.31 0.3 0.35 0.25
St. Dev. 0,46 0,47 0,45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.43
Observations 1248 528 720 642 223 419 606 305 301
Catalan voting (CIU+ERC+IC)--only voters Average 0,66 0,63 0,68 0.71 0.68 0.73 0.59 0.58 0.59
St. Dev. 0,47 0,48 0,46 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.49 0.49 0.49
Observations 941 439 502 503 190 313 438 249 189
Catalan voting (CIU+ERC)--only voters Average 0,58 0,57 0,60 0.62 0.59 0.64 0.54 0.55 0.53
St. Dev. 0,49 0,49 0,48 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.5
Observations 941 439 502 503 190 313 438 249 189
Catalan voting (CIU)--only voters Average 0,41 0,40 0,41 0.4 0.36 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.41
St. Dev. 0,49 0,49 0,49 0.49 0.18 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Observations 941 439 502 503 190 313 438 249 189
Language at home Average 0,44 0,47 0,41 0.5 0.54 0.47 0.36 0.42 0.31
St. Dev. 0,49 0,49 0,49 0.5 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.46
Observations 1340 561 779 692 238 454 648 323 325
Intensity of treatment Average 3,83 0,00 6,47 5.17 0 7.85 2.23 0 4.36
St. Dev. 4,54 0,00 4,21 4.89 0 3.9 3.47 0 3.78
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
Intensity of (compulsory) treatment Average 2,41 0,00 4,07 2.8 0 4.26 1.94 0 3.79
St. Dev. 3,26 0,00 3,35 3.37 0 3.32 3.08 0 3.39
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
Female Average 0,49 0,48 0,49 0.49 0.44 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.45
St. Dev. 0,50 0,50 0,50 0.5 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.48 0.49
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
Table 1
Cohorts (total sample) Cohorts (with sec. edu) Cohorts (without sec. edu)
Table 2: Reform and Turnout
Dependent variable:Turnout
OLS  Logit OLS  Logit
[1] [2] [3] [4]
intensity  .056*** .045***  .057*** .045***
 (.018)  (.015)  (.018) (.015)
non catalan origin  -.113*   -.142*
 (.057)  (.073)
cat origin mixed family -.084**  -.095***
 (.039)  (.045)
cat origin non catalan family  -.1291***  -.144***
 (.038) (.043)
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES NO NO YES YES
No. obs. 1248 1248 1248 1248
Rsq .078 .099
Pseudo-Rsq .071 .093
* Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Robust
standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-
years of education level. Individual controls include a dummy variable for gender, for
individuals not born in Catalonia, individuals born in Catalonia but with non-catalan
parents and individuals born in Catalonia with mixed parents. Marginal effects
evaluated at the average are reported for the logit regressions.
Table 3: Reform and Ethnic voting (1)
Dependent variable:Probability of ethnic voting (among voters)
CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC CIU+ERC CIU CIU CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC CIU+ERC CIU CIU
OLS  Logit OLS  Logit OLS  Logit OLS  Logit OLS  Logit OLS  Logit
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
intensity   .041*** .046***  .047**  .049**   .049***  .053***  .040**  .051***  .046**   .057**  .049**   .052**
 (.018)  (.017)  (.020)  (.087)    (.020)   (.022)  (.016)  (.017)  (.019)   (.023)   (.020) (.022)
non catalan origin  -.359*** -.408*** -.399***   -.423***  -.169**   -.171**
 (.072)  (.074)  (.072)  (.063) (.075)   (.070)
cat origin mixed family  -.135***  -.179***   -.183***  -.220***   -.044   -.046
(.042)  (.054) (.021)   (.053) ( .061)  (.061)
cat origin non catalan family  -.382***  -.429***  -.412***  -.442***  -.156***   -.160***
 (.045)  (.051)   (.051)  (.050)   (.048)    (.047)
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. obs.   941   941   941   941   941   941   941   941   941   941   941   941
Rsq .057   .04 .054 .194  .194 .084
Pseudo-Rsq .046 .030 .042 .161 .153 .065
* Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Robust standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education
level. Individual controls include a dummy variable for gender, for individuals not born in Catalonia, individuals born in Catalonia but with non-catalan parents and individuals born in
Catalonia with mixed parents. Marginal effects evaluated at the average are reported for the logit regressions.
Table 4: Reform and Ethnic voting (2)
Dependent variable:Probability of ethnic voting (among all citizens)
CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC CIU+ERC CIU CIU CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC CIU+ERC CIU CIU
OLS  Logit OLS  Logit OLS  Logit OLS  Logit OLS  Logit OLS  Logit
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
intensity  .049***  .057***  .053***  .059***   .048***  .053***   .054***   .068***  .057***  .071***    .050***  .055**
 (.015)   (.017)  (.017)  (.019)  (.016)  (.091)  (.014)  (.018)   (.016)    (.020)  (.016)  (.019)
non catalan origin  -.363***  -.347***  -.381***  -.335***   -.182***  -.158***
 (.067)  (.053)   (.064)  (.045)  (.063)  (.049)
cat origin mixed family   -.176***   -.190***  -.207***   -.204*** -.077   -.073
  (.043)   (.044)  (.045)  (.040)  (.051)  (.045)
cat origin non catalan family   -.368***  -.379***  -.377***  -.370***  -.164***  -.157***
  (.038)  (.035)  (.043)  (.037)  (.041)   (.035)
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. obs.  1248  1248  1248  1248  1248  1248  1248  1248  1248  1248  1248  1248
Rsq .062 .053 .055 .174 .176 .087
Pseudo-Rsq .047 .004 .048 .134 .137 .075
* Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Robust standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education
level. Individual controls include a dummy variable for gender, for individuals not born in Catalonia, individuals born in Catalonia but with non-catalan parents and individuals born in
Catalonia with mixed parents. Marginal effects evaluated at the average are reported for the logit regressions.
Table 5: Reform and voting patterns 
Dependent variable:Voting choice (marginal effects)  
Abstain Ethnicvoting Non Ethnicvoting Abstain Ethnicvoting Non Ethnicvoting Abstain Ethnicvoting Non Ethnicvoting
MLOGIT MLOGIT MLOGIT MPROBIT MPROBIT MPROBIT ASMPROBIT ASMPROBIT ASMPROBIT
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
intensity  -.024*  .065***   -.042**   -.022   .065***  -.043** -0,022  .064*** -.042*
  (.014)   (.017)  (.017)   (.014)  (.017)   (.017) (0.031)  (.021)   (.022)
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. obs.  1248 1248 1248
* Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Robust standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education level. Individual
controls include a dummy variable for gender, for individuals not born in Catalonia, individuals born in Catalonia but with non-catalan parents and individuals born in Catalonia with mixed parents. Each
group of three columns corresponds to a regression.
Table 6: The role of individual origin
Dependent variable:
OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit
(coeff) (coeff) (coeff)
[1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2]
intensity*non cat.origin  .069***   .355***  .045*   .252**  .066**   .325***
 (.022)  (.111)  (.024)   (.114)  (.020)   (.100)
intensity*cat.family  .056***   .268***  .042**    .265***  .054***  .274***
 (.018)  (.094)  (.016)  (.084)  (.014)   (.071)
intensity*mixed family   .070***   .366***  .026   .169**  .052*** .263***
 (.018)  (.095)  (.016)   (.085)  (.016)  (.078)
intensity*non cat.family  .047**   .247**  .043**   .246***  .054***  .261***
 (.021)  (.104)  (.018)   (.090)  (.016)  (.081)
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. obs.  1248  1248  941  941  1248  1248
Rsq .107 .197 .175
Pseudo Rsq .100 .165 .135
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* Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Robust standard errors are
reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education level. Individual controls
include a dummy variable for gender, for individuals not born in Catalonia, individuals born in Catalonia but
with non-catalan parents and individuals born in Catalonia with mixed parents.
Figure 5: Changes in the probability of voting by intensity and origin: 1=catalan origin with catalan
parents, 2=catalan origin with mixed parents, 3=catalan origin with parents that are not catalan, 4= not
catalan origin
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
0 5 10 15
intensity3
yhat_, originindex == 1 yhat_, originindex == 2
yhat_, originindex == 3 yhat_, originindex == 4
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
0 5 10 15
intensity3
yhat_, originindex == 1 yhat_, originindex == 2
yhat_, originindex == 3 yhat_, originindex == 4
Figure 6: Changes in the probability of voting for an ethnic party (among voters) by intensity and origin:
1=catalan origin with catalan parents, 2=catalan origin with mixed parents, 3=catalan origin with parents
that are not catalan, 4= not catalan origin
Figure 7: Changes in the probability of voting for an ethnic party (among all) by intensity and origin:
1=catalan origin with catalan parents, 2=catalan origin with mixed parents, 3=catalan origin with parents
that are not catalan, 4= not catalan origin
Table 7: Robustness checks 
PANEL A
1934-1965 1934-1965 1934-1965 1934-1965 1934-1965 1934-1965 1921-1980 1921-1980 1921-1980 1921-1980 1921-1980 1921-1980
voting voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting  voting  voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting
(voters) (voters) (all) (all) (voters) (voters) (all) (all)
OLS  Logit OLS  Logit OLS  Logit OLS  Logit OLS  Logit OLS  Logit
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
intensity  .049** .032***   .044**  .049**   .056***   .066***
 (.020)  (.017)  (.021)  (.023)  (.019)   (.024)
pseudo-intensity  -.001  -.013   .017   .019    .016   .018   .002 -0.00   -.012   -.013  -.011   -.013
 (.008)   (.092)  (.013)   (.013)  (.012)   (.013)  (.011)   (.014)  (.018)   (.020)  (.017)   (.021)
No. obs.  862  862    734    734  862  862  1674  1674 1386 1386  1674  1674
Rsq .337 .171 .163 .107 .178 .179
Pseudo-Rsq .097 .148 .130 .113 .153 .141
* Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Robust standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-
years of education level. Individual controls include a dummy variable for gender, for individuals not born in Catalonia, individuals born in Catalonia but with non-
catalan parents and individuals born in Catalonia with mixed parents. Marginal effects evaluated at the average are reported for the logit regressions. All regressions
include year of birth, province and years of education dummies.
